Mr. A. H. Rudd,

     Mr. Dobson told you I would answer any questions you might ask. I didn't tell him any such thing at all. I'll agree to answer any questions that you ask me that are not technical and don't really pertain to signalling, because I don't know very much about it myself, but I think that is one reason why I am Chief Signal Engineer. I am very successful with it too--got a lot of good men and they do know.

     I do want to tell you a few things and, after I have told them to you, the best thing you can do is go away and forget them, because you'll have to throw away a lot of useless stuff and assimilate that which is useful and the less you know about signals the better you are off. Except for their indications, the less you know about how they work and the men that take care of them, the better you are off. Signalling is the least understood and the least appreciated and the most complicated branch of railroading. The reason it is not known is because the Signalmen are so modest. They never speak of it. The old motto, "Blow your own horn lest it be not blown", is forgotten in signal work, so they put me up here, who don't know very much about it, to blow our horn. And I am going to try to blow it a little bit.

     Now, the Signal Department, as I see it, and the Railroad, as I see it, might be likened to a yellow dog. Everydody's kicking him around. They haven't any friends. I guess, probably, we have less than others, because we are so much better, and I think the Signal Department is very much like the can on the dog's tail. It keeps the dog moving, but the dog doesn't know it. He thinks it just annoys him and it is something he would like to get rid of, but can't. Signalling is really the art of saving and safety--that is what it makes the dog do. The Motive Power Department, the Auditing Department and all the other departments are ahead of the Signal Department because, you notice, they are on the opposite end of the dog from the tail.

     About the only time we really get any attention from the head is when they are reducing expenses, and then the dog turns around to find the tail and stop our activities. It you will look at the Signal Department from that point of view, you will realize how little it is worth, really, and how little we should talk about it; so I have decided to-night that I won't talk about modern signalling very much. There isn't any such thing in the first place. What is modern today is a back number to-morrow. We make progress so fast that we change standards every few minutes. I suppose that I have been hammered and pounded more for changing standards than anybody on this Railroad. We must keep changing the standards, but our people seem to forget that what is standard one week is standard until something else is put in its place and that we have, I presume, over fifty standards for each particular unit we operate. As I see it, the Pennsylvania Railroad is known as the STANDARD RAILROAD OF AMERICA, and everything we have got is standard and we have got every standard there is. I think that is particularly true in the Motive Power Department. I have got a boy in that Department, so I can say anything I please without being criticised and I often think if we handled our work like most railroad people do, we would be at the top of the heap.

     Dick Dunn was an old Mason on the New Haven Railroad. He was building a cellar or something and was told, "It is outrageous to spend so much money." "Well," he said, "The more it cost, the more glory."

     As I see it, if we could have the number of accidents the Motive Power people have, we could have more money to fix them. The more money we got, the more trouble we would have; the more trouble we would have, the more money we would get; and I have often thought if I got fired off the road, maybe I would go off and I wouldn't do much, just cut a couple of wires that I know of and then they would see what an awful lot of trouble there was. Nobody knows we are around most of the time.

     I have this all written up, but I never stick to these notes very much.

     We have a lot of trains that are stopped by signals; we have a lot of trains that are not stopped by signals; we have had some that should be stopped; and that is the reason the Interstate Commerce want us to put in train control. I am going to talk about that some and the highway protection a little and just as little about signals as I can because, where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise, and what, you don't know won't hurt you.

     Now, I want to show you these charts before I forget them. (Here Mr. Rudd used an indicator to point out on a blue print which was spread on a table on the platform that various items which he mentioned.) That is a chart of the heart beats of the signal business. Looks like a seismograph. That is the way the signals look. They are temperamental and climatic. This is the chart of January, 1916, when we started to keep this record, and it shows by months the performance of signalling. These are the failures, the total failures of signals and switches and lamps and everything connected with signals, all except the Signalman. Their failures are down below the bottom. There is the month of April, 1916. There is July and there is October. They jump up in the winter. That is February, March. There is April. There is June, dropped down a little; and September was the low month instead of October. There is September, October and November. There is your January, February, February sheet. There is April. There is May, June. There is your August. Here is your September and October. There is your January. February was a pretty mild time. April is not quite as low as February. There is July. Here is September and October, and there is December. They went up pretty high, very high in fact. That is what lead to the re-organization. That was in December, 1919. That is one of the things that lead to it. Now, right in here, is the time in May, 1918, that the famous order came out increasing our pay. This was the winter, a hard winter, you remember, very hard. Here was your summer record. That started increasing your pay. You notice how this summer went up. You notice how that winter went up. That summer went up away above any of these sheets. Here is where Supplement No. 17, I think it was, came out. The more it cost, the more glory. The more pay we got, the shorter hours, the worse the performance got. It went up here. That is the Eastern Region, the old Lines East of Pittsburgh that some of us used to know about. That was before prohibition too. Here is the System record, started in March. We didn't keep that record for January and February because there was not any System and there was not any Eastern Region. Here is you April, May and June; there is July; here is your October, November. Look where we landed in January. That is a mild winter. There is March. That is the one year where April doesn't strike the lowest point. See where this summer was. Here is you January. Here is your April. Here is your summer way low and it did go up again in December of this year. But it is funny. Every April, we get a low month and in October we get a low month. Now I presume, as I size it up, I presume we go through a winter and take care of things and in the Spring we must make a clean-up and get ready for summer and it gets pretty hot. Then, in the summer, we have the rain storms and the thunderstorms and lots of track circuit trouble in the summer and practically none in the winter, when things are frozen up. Ties are disturbed and dirt gets on top and then a cold rain comes on top of the dirt and gives us track circuit failures. In October, we get ready to go into the winter again. Everything is in apple pie order. Then we go into the winter and freeze up and have trouble again in the spring. I suppose that is the explanation, the best I have been able to get. I have asked lots of fellows and they swear there is nothing to it. They work hard all the time, day and night, winter and summer, just like a Fireman does when they have a wreck.

     We have 17,000 high signals, 4,800 low--a total of 21,800; and 9,300 interlocking switches; or 31,100 altogether. one-tenth of all in the United States and, as I have said before, they are almost always on the job-----a d---- sight more than a man.

     I heard a fellow say something the other day about a man flagging a train. He was flagging the train and someone said to him, "What are you flagging for?" "I don't know," he said, "the boss told me to." He was asked, "Where is he?" And he replied, "Down below there half a mile, where the bridge is washed down".

     In December, 1923, we ran 116,000 trains and we had 120 of them derailed by switch and signal failures. In November, we had 113,000 trains and 104 derailed by signals failures. That means one train was derailed in November, 1923, out of 1088. In December, one in every 963. There were 3 1/2 trains derailed for every 1,000 switches and signals in the whole month. The percentage of signal failures to all other failures was .016 in November and .015 in December. While we were delaying 963 trains by a signal or switch failure in December, 1923, other failures were delaying 7,000 trains and the signal average less than a mile apart over the Main Line. During the first ten months of 1923; the cost was $4,500,000. That is an awful lot of money. That is .073 of the operative revenue. At the rate of $5,250,000.00 a year, I don't know how much traffic was expedited by that, but I guess some, and it does seem a lot of money, doesn't it? Our accident insurance was $478,000.00 in September, 1923, and $437,000.00 in October, 1923, which runs to just about the cost of maintaining the signals and switches in the signal work. In other words, we pay for expediting trains an insurance against accidents just about what the accidents cost us. If we didn't have that, we would probably have less accidents. That may sound funny, but it isn't. I'll illustrate it by a story.

     A fellow up in my country--I come from northwestern Connecticut--was quite a farmer and he was out on a cow case and the Attorney asked, "Which cows give the most milk?" And Eb said, "Red ones." The Attorney asked, "How do you make that out?" "Well," he said, "Because there are more of them."

     I think the reason we wouldn't have so many wrecks is that we wouldn't be running so many trains.

     I told you our people spend too much money and I don't know what we are going to do if we keep on spending the money as we are spending it.

     That reminds me of a story.

     The other day, a young fellow got married. Both he and his wife had money. She had never done any cooking or housework, but kind of felt they ought to start on first principles and get a house. She would take care of the house and he would run the farm. She wanted to live on a farm because she never lived on one. So they bought a farm and stocked it up with chickens and animals of different kinds. Then he got a farmer to run it, because he didn't know how. He was telling this friend of mine about it. "Finally," he said, "one day, Mary cooked the whole dinner and I ate it." At least that is what he said. "I got along pretty well until finally she brought in something and I said, 'What is that?' And she said, 'That is angel food.' I looked at it and I took a knife and hacked a piece of sponge out of it and then, when she went out for a minute, I threw the dish out in the back yard before she came back. During the next few minutes I was kept pretty busy explaining what I had done with the 'angel food', when there as a knock on the door and the farmer came in and said, 'I got some pretty bad news for you.' 'What is it?' I asked, and he said 'Your ducks have all sunk.' "

     That is what may happen to us if we keep on spending money.

     I suppose you people--how long do I have to talk?--I suppose you people here been getting some statistics lately about how we ought to cut down on our cost, number of men, etc. I got some.

     I had a friend who had a friend who was always trading horses, down in Philadelphia. This man had a farm and was trading horses with a friend of his and the principal thing was, not to get a horse, but to stick the other fellow. Finally, he told me, he saw he had a horse one day that this fellow wanted, and he said, "That is a likely looking horse; you can have him for the price." So he finally settled with him, closed the bargain. "The horse is down in the lot. You can go down and get him." He went down and got him after three hours in the fence corner, caught him and brought him back. When he came up, he said, "Now I'll tell you. I have got the horse. I would like to know what it the matter with him. I know there is something or you wouldn't part with him." My friend said, "There's two things the matter with him. In the first place, he's hard to catch. In the second place, he ain't worth a d--- after you have caught him."

     I feel that way a good bit about statistics. You can't run the road on them and yet one of the best things we do, really, is statistics. It is one of the best things the New York central does. I know, I worked with them once. They are the only road that ever fired me. Mr. Dice was superintendent of signals and I was his assistant. He went to the Reading, but it is the best thing that ever happened to me. But I want to tell you something. We have got statistics that our Signal Department has twice as many men or more than twice as many as the New York Central. Our fellows are not attending to business. And they have about as many signals on the New York Central, nearly as many as we have; about the same mileage, within 1,000 or so of the switches, which takes quite a lot of work. That sounds awful, doesn't it? Our men take care of the telegraphy and the signals, but the folks who made those statistics don't know that the New York Central had a contract with the Western Union to maintain all its telegraph trouble and that, east of Buffalo and Erie, they have a company organized which takes care of all the new signal work and heavy renewals. I pointed out to them that if we cut out our men who took care of the telegraph work and also our new work, we would have less men. They made statistics on one of the regions and found this was true. My people furnish me with statistics too, and good statistics. But they ought to have marked on every one of them, no matter where they come from, "Dictated, but not read." If you will only tell me what you want to prove, I can furnish statistics and they will be right too, they will be correct.

     I was going to tell you where we were pioneers in signalling and have been all the way through, but I haven't time, because I want to talk to you about train control and grade crossing stations. Those are my hobbies. I was talking about train control, highway crossing stations, but I see you have got all these questions and I suppose you want me to say something so you can ask questions after I get through; otherwise, there wouldn't be any point to my talk.

     1. Should not modern signalling include some special signal for foggy weather?

     Well I think it should, then I think you should use it in clear weather too. We have had very few accidents due to signals being disregarded on this railroad and those we have had have, in many cases, not been the fault of the Enginemen. I have no use for a man who says, "We ought to put train control on the railroad because our Enginemen are careless." It is a lie. They are not. We have a few men who are taking chances. They ought to get fired--that would be the best thing that could happen to them, because they will get killed or kill somebody. A man who disregards a yellow is not fit to go on the railroad. I wouldn't wait until he had an accident. I am not an operating man and don't a d---- thing about railroading, but I wouldn't let a man that is taking chances run any more if I could help it.

     I have analyzed the accidents we have had in the last eight or ten years. Tyrone was a chance where a man was taking a signal and had a mental lapse--it was not carelessness. Mt. Union was an honest mistake. Allwood was, perhaps, a doze for a minute; at any rate, there was a signal missed in the fog, in a severe fog. I can mention half a dozen others, but they were not the fault of the Enginemen to such an extent that they were crimminally responsible, as a man is who deliberately takes a chance on a caution signal and runs so fast that he can't stop at a home, like that one on the New York Central up at Forsythe. He knew he couldn't get stopped. He didn't try, because he figured that the other fellow was a block ahead of him and was just catching up, also he didn't figure that the train ahead would stop because those gentlemen got their automobile on the track. That was an unfortunate situation too. That automobile was 150 ft. up the railroad, off the crossing, when the train struck. It was runninng in low gear and got off the road and ran 150 ft., nobody in it when it struck. If I was doing that business, if I were the jury, they wouldn't get much insurance on it. They got up and fouled on that railroad, didn't know there was a turn, had a special highway crossing sign of the State of New York, a wigwag and a bell and they did not know they were on the crossing and, yet, were well away from the machine when it got hit. We have these people. It was foggy so that being stalled on the road, if anybody came along the highway, they would not see them. Those are the kind of drivers that raise hop. One or two of them were asleep.

     Reminds me of a story. A couple of men were out riding in that same condition and one said to the other, "If you don't steer more carefully, we are going to get into trouble." And the other said, "I thought you were driving."

     Those fellows are like a Cherokee Indian my brother was telling me about who had a Ford. This Indian was pretty badly mixed up. My brother said to him, ,'What is the matter, Joe?" And Joe said, "Take one drink, drive fine; take two drinks, drive fine; take 3 drinks, drive like h----; see big bridge coming, turn out."

     This train control has cost us, so far $315,000.00, 12 engines to experiment with and we put in 45 miles of single track. It is a wonderful thing. It is almost human. Does everything but talk when it works and it works most of the time and it works on the right side. Nearly every day we get some train stopped, because if it had gone along, it might have gone wrong. It will cost us to equip this railroad about $315,000,000.00. If any of you fellows have a few odd millions you don't need, the management will be awfully glad to get them, because they don't know anywhere else.

     Bob Newbern, head of our insurance department, has an uncle working on the problem. He recently got an automobile. He put on his carburetor saved 25% in fuel; got ball bearings and saved 15%; according to the advertisement a manifold saved 25% more. Before he was through he saved 125%. He started out for a ride with half a tank and before he got in the gasoline got out and now he spends his time in the garage pumping the gasoline tank to save it.

     If we could do that, we could get money for train control. Now, let us see what we get out of it. We have orders to put two more Divisions, the first order was for the main line passenger engine division between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. We got that changed to between Baltimore and Harrisburg. One engine division on the West Jersey and Seashore Railroad between Camden and Atlantic City and one on the Panhandle and we picked out Indianapolis to Columbus; and now we got orders to put another one on the Panhandle and one on the Main Line Division between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. For putting the control on the Northern Central, Baltimore to Harrisburg, without the train control--just the automatic signal--would cost $1,400,000.00. It will cost $2,000,000.00 to equip the railroad. The West Jersey and Seashore Railroad is wonderfully prosperous. I think we will get that $2,000,000.00 by increasing the dividends on the same basis as the automobile fellow. The Panhandle will cost about $2,500,000.00. What do we get out of it? In 1921, in collisions, we killed two passengers on the Pennsylvania System; and in 1922, we killed six; and in 1923, we didn't kill one. There are eight passengers in three years. Of course, we have killed twenty-five or thirty employes, but they don't count so much. They are part of the organization like we are; but, at that, only twenty or forty of us went in three years and, in that time, we killed, or really they killed themselves on grade crossings, 711, ninety times as many. With $115,000,000.00 we could put up the flashing lights that are standard and which are worth the money. We could put them up and operate them to show when trains are coming on 57,000 crossings. Or, we can do away, with 2,500 grade crossings, at $50,000.00. What is the answer? The sensible answer, if good engineering consists in spending the money to get the most out of it--what is the answer? Train control. And those years I spoke of were not unusual years. What if the answer? The answer is, "Go ahead and put on train control." The Interstate Commerce Commission wants it. By the time you got half in, the State would order separating grade crossings. New Jersey doesn't pay a cent. The State of Ohio pays now, I think the new law is, the railroad pays 35% and the town or state 65%. Most of the states pay about 50-50. In Pennsylvania, it depends on the Public Service Commission, New York the same way. That protects 57,000 crossings, if we pay it all. If we pay half of it, we can put in 114,000 crossings. That would save some lives, I don't know how many. It is a negative proposition. I judge we would save more than eight in three years. I judge there are more than eight innocent bystanders about 7-8 of the others we wouldn't save anyhow. 3% of the drivers of automobiles are killed and 70% or 80% of the people we kill on the crossings belong in that 3%. 4% of the male population of the United States are color blind. There are almost no color blind women. They are as rare as Albinos. One fourth of the drivers are women. Dilute that 4% to 3% and you get 3% of the drivers killed and 3% color blind. Every one of those fellows we get protects the people on the highway, because if we don't get them, they would get somebody else. There is no closed season for them.

     Of course, I know bonus is an ugly word. We have heard a lot about it lately. Some people are for it and some against it. I had a boy over on the other side and he can't see it, but I am for it. I am strongly for the bonus, but I think our folks are too narrow down there in Washington, They just want to give it to the servicemen and I would give it to each taxpayer. Why not be broad in this thing? And then I would reduce the taxes. Then I would pay for it by putting in train control. I want to leave that thought with you. This question of highway crossing dangers versus train control. I have been quoted as against train control--I am not. I think it is a wonderful thing. I ride those engines up there and I feel more comfortable than if I didn't have it. That is, on a mild day. When they freeze up, and they sometimes do, you don't feel as comfortable because you have to stop and cut it out and go on under dispatcher's orders, but it is a wonderful thing. And if you could put it in for one-half what it cost, it would be an economical thing to do. When you have to spend more than other railroad spend and then only save five people a year, there is nothing to it, but we have the orders of the Interstate Commerce commission to put it in and I suppose it has got to go. Only I do want to have you realize what it does. I would tell you a lot about the workings of that thing. We put this in, as I said, and asked the Interstate Commerce Commission to inspect it and see if it was the proper thing for us to put in. They gave us until July 1, 1923, to finish the experiment and we didn't get it working until July 11th, and they have absolutely refused to inspect it until we put in an engine division as they order. We have spent $315,000.00 to demonstrate this thing and see if it was the thing to put in, and, having done it, the Interstate Commerce Commission say, "We won't inspect it, but you spend $2,000,000.00 more on the Baltimore Division, because that is what we want and, when that is in, we will inspect it and tell you if it is satisfactory, and, if it is not, you can take it out and put in something else." What would you do?

     2. I see one of the questions is, "What are the advantages of a light indication on a semaphore?"

     As an indication, there aren't any, provided you can see the semaphore as well as you can see the light. There are certain daylight conditions when you can see a semaphore better than you can a light signal. There are certain daylight conditions when you can't. There are certain conditions at night when you can see a position light signal better than any other light signal and when you can see a colored light signal better than you can see semaphore. But the principal thing about a semaphore is the moving part. Our semaphores in the old days were lower, as you know, arm down. They have some on the West Jersey & Seashore Railroad yet. They're all wrong. They were built that way because, when it was first invented in England, there were no signs and, when they ordered a train to stop, they would pull this arm up to stop the train. One day, the rope broke and the train went on. Another train stopped it. Then they decided it was a good thing to have it pulled up, so they have the arm pushed up and they stopped it about here (indicating) so as to show the engineer there was an arm on, and that was a big advantage--wonderful--until the rope broke again and it was down here (indicating) exposed, with a busted rope. Then they decided that they ought to have it counterweighted so it would go to stop and, if anything broke, it would stop; so they put a 50 lb. counterweight on to hold the arm, and that was a big advantage, but it was all right when a man pulled it, but when we came to the winter with the ice and snow, more than 60 lbs. had to be raised every time the signal was operated and a large part of it overcame the ice two or three weeks of the year. So some bright soul decided to just have the upper quadrant instead of having a counterweight here to pull this arm up. If nothing breaks, it held and pulled up like that, and if anything broke, it dropped itself. The more icey and rainy and snowy it got, the more it dropped. They did away with a lot of the trouble and most roads are using upper quadrant signals now except that Burlington and some of the others are still using white for clear.

     We cut down our failures tremendously. I hadn't meant to read these, but in 1920 on the system we had 61 false failures; in 1921, we had 42; and in 1922, we had 46, due to the signals. And out of those 61, there were 29 due to signal mechanism in 1920; 29 in 1921; and 26 in 1922. We hadn't a false clear in a position light signal and we hadn't a false clear with a color signal. We had one on account of lamp breaking, we had 11 on account of signal circuit control; we had 40 from the wires catching and we had 8 on the old mechanical signal.

     Where you use the semaphore, you have a system of signals; one for daylight and another for dark and it changes at dusk and dawn, just the times when you need the signals most and at a time when the semaphore is the hardest to see. There are periods of the day when the arm almost disappears because there isn't too much light around. With your colored light--like they have on the New Haven--or with a position light those days when the others are hard to see, are the times when these are most vivid. Your position light is better than any. We admit that. We have them on the railroad and the other fellows are coming by freight. The Lehigh Valley made a standard; the Northwestern have a couple and ordered some in the last few weeks; and the Central Railroad of New Jersey, the Monongahela and the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie are all buying them, getting some in Denmark and some in Japan. The Philadelphia and Reading feel that the colored position, from an engineering standpoint, is the most wonderful thing advanced and the reason is they want a position signal on account of the color blind men and color for the men with astigmatism. I asked if they were running on semaphore and said, "You better pull them right out of there." They are liable to think it is clear when it is a stop. The reason we used position light is it takes less current. You can't force light through a red or green glass or opaque glass with the same amount of current. From an engineering standpoint, a color light signal is poor because you are wasting energy in trying to push through the colored light and the reason that we adopted the color set is because Mt. Churchill, who worked with me on that, had been making a lot of tests with the colored headlights on the railroads at the time the government wanted to put in high power day-light, and he found you could get a beautiful signal with a small reflector from the headlight. That is the reason, when we got high power headlights, we put in canvass headlights, now we have signals in back of them. One of the New York Central engines came up and shone through and showed a green light so much brighter that they didn't recognize the yellow one. Those phantom lights are a snare. Churchill was working and found we could get the light with a very small lamp. He also found that the Government couldn't use the arc lights and electric lights in their light houses because they didn't penetrate the fog, and he told me he didn't see that there was anything in kerosene running up a waste that would benefit the light. Finally, he put a yellow light over the grey one and then it penetrated the fog. He found out that the blue rays in the white light are reflected back so that they won't go through. When you eliminate them, then they will run through and the position light shines so through the blue that you can see the rays when you can't see the light. The colored light is uneconomical. More roads are installing colored lights than position lights. I don't think they will on the Pennsylvania Railroad. That will give you something to discuss on the first question.

     3. The second question, "What can a supervisory officer do to educate men in the train control system?

     I say, he had better let it alone for a while. Educate them in other things until we get installed and know more about it.

     4. And the third thing is, "Should not modern signalling include some signalling to use used in foggy weather?"

     I have two minutes more, if that clock is right. (Consults his watch.) It is slow.

     For years and years, I have furnished arguments against cab signals in engines. They took the man's attention from the signals, took his eyes from the road, they were a snare and a delusion. I have been watching for over a year now, a year and a half to be exact, in connection with our train control and, believe me, they are the answer. If we could get the money, if we could get the powers in Washington to agree to it, we could put the cab signals on our engines, one on the Fireman's side and one on the Engineman's side and our troubles would be pretty nearly over. The men do misread them. They do miss them in the fog. Mr. D---, Chief of the Pennsylvania Accident Company, said, if we had those cab signals on our engines so that, if a man did miss a back signal, he would still get a repeater, I don't mean those that sit here and stay that way, but those that look out and note circuits and carry a continuous indication so that the man gets a clear view of the position ahead and then he gets his restricted signal until they change again--if we had those on our engines, I don't believe we would have a wreck once a year. They would cost as much as train control. We could railroad with them and I think the men would obey them and we wouldn't have the trouble that we have and we wouldn't have the expense. I believe the cab signals, day or night, in fog or clear weather, are a tremendous big help if we can get the money to add it to our present automatic signal system. And, if the engineman missed it, if anything happened to it, the fireman could get it after he finished shoveling coal. I am amazed that we have tanks on our engines big enough to hold the coal that the fireman shovel on a trip. Because I have never, with the exception of the Mt. Union wreck, seen a case where the signals were run by, when the examination came up but what the fireman was "shoveling coal". He was "working at the fire and didn't see it and the engineman hollered 'Green' and he hollered 'Green'." I want to leave that thought with you. I said that in Sunbury and got a rise out of one of the road foremen or engines. He was going to see me afterwards and he was pretty large. I didn't know about it until I got to the train, or I would have gone back.

     I don't think there is anything else I can tell you and I will leave it to you if I have told you anything that was worth listening to. We have had a pleasant hour and I will be glad to answer any questions, providing they are not about signalling.

     Applause.

     F. L .D.: We might as well have our discussion now while it is fresh in your minds. Gentlemen, if there are any questions you would like to ask, Mr. Rudd will try to answer them.

     Mr. Rudd: Any signalmen in this audience? If they ask questions, all right?

     F. L. D.: Mr. Keleher, have you some questions you would like to ask Mr. Rudd?

     Mr. Keleher: Not now.

     F. L. D.: Mr. Rudd thought you would have some questions to ask him. Surely, some of you have some questions you would like to ask Mr. Rudd on this.

     Mr. Rudd: It is awfully confusing to answer all those questions at once. One at a time.

     F. L. D. I am looking for some of these men.

     Mr. Rudd: Of course, they don't want to ask questions. Didn't you tell them the police band was coming down after the meeting?

     Mr. A. W. Reynolds: Is it possible that the radio will have anything to do with train control in the future?

     Mr. Rudd: According to reports in the Washington papers, a report which I receive a short time ago, some of the engineering folks connected with signalling say it has already done so. The interference is so bad, according to the reports in Washington now, that the stock extra on the Lewistown Branch can't run at night. A funny thing, that stock extra. It goes over from Lewistown to Sunbury early in the evening after the passenger train has been taken in at night and it goes back again early in the morning. It is the only train that I ever knew that has no failures on it. All the others have failures. I investigated it and found that they don't have any observer on that train, so I suggested to the supervisor in charge that they take the observers off all the trains and we wouldn't have any failures on any of them and he got sore. That stock extra goes over the road without any interference at all. One reason is that they set the railroad for it one way and then the dispatchers don't worry about it and, as long as they don't worry, they don't take the signals away and give them to a fellow going the other way. I don't think the radio will have any effect. It hasn't yet. A peculiar thing about Lewistown--it has a back run. I haven't any wireless. I am going to wait until they are cheaper and better and then I will get one. I was in the car one night with Raughley and he wanted to try his wireless and couldn't get Philadelphia. He never could get Philadelphia, but finally he got it--the first time in a year. He figured it was because I was up there and they had my address, but, any way, while we were working, the fireman come in and reported what had happened during the day with the train control. This car was right near the round house and, whenever they came in from a run, they would drop in and tell him what had happened. This fellow had never heard a wireless and finally we got him to listen in. It was pretty good for a while. Finally, he said to me, "Have you got a set?" I said, "No, but in a couple of years, we will hear the angels singing." Then there was something on and he said, "What is it?" I said, "Nobody knows." And he said, "Maybe that is the angels singing and our ears aren't tuned in for it."

     But they did try train control and it doesn't affect it at all. No, I don't think; of course, you never can tell, they're operating torpedoes for wireless now and submarines.

     A. W. Reynolds: It might do like the first automatic signal.

     Mr. Rudd: Maybe wireless will effect it. There is one train control that they put out that is operated entirely by wireless. That is in Detroit.

     A. W. Reynolds: The reason I asked is that, if they ever get the Government's support so they could throw it high enough not to interfere with wireless, it would be a success.

     Mr. Rudd: We talked about using a wireless for the dispatcher's control, but I don't think it will affect the track circuit or the actual control from one train to another, but I think it will get to working so that it will get the dispatchers in on the train. The way that is arranged on the eastern end is what we call the dispatcher's control. The fellow in Sunbury Station sets up his route for a train westbound and he controls the track service so that the train moving west can run at full speed. If a failure should occur on the track circuit, he can easily get it stopped. When they want a man to come east, they have to reverse it. We have no signal back and very often they will set a signal in front of a fellow by mistake and that causes some delay. We have had some trouble with our track circuits because, as a matter of fact, the track circuit is a wrong principle. The open track circuit is wrong in principle because it requires the closing of the circuit in order to stop the signal. Mr. Robinson invented the closed track. The open being wrong, of course, the closed was right. But that depends on the contact of the wheels. Therefore, the only two kinds of train circuits possible are both wrong in principle. Just think what that means. If you are alive, yet you are dead. You are wrong anyway.

     J. A. Sheedy: How long will it take to install automatic train control on an engine?

     Mr. Rudd: I can't tell. I have heard there are about 7,500 different kinds, but the one we are using, we figured on about 48 man hours. I can tell you what it would take--about two months for each one up in Altoona. Of course, they had class repairs first, then we put these on. Eliot, (addressing Supt. Motive Power Eliot Summer) you don't mind me saying it. We got it repaired and then we were classified. Then we put the train control on and three of the engines broke down between Altoona and Lewistown. Then they sent them back. It was not the train what broke, it was the repairs. That took some time. I could tell you some more details about it, but I won't. Now, the arrangement is entirely revised. The air-brake stuff is all that is put on, beautifully developed, is all a back number. We have a brand new one now that is entirely different that, they say, ought not to take so much to put on. I think you can glue that on in about three or four minutes, according to their account, and it won't cost more than $1,000.00 to put it on because I find that up at Altoona even the glue was expensive. The estimated cost of the equipment is placed by the United States Service and Signal Company at $3,000.00, of which they got $2,500.00. The charges we got were over $4,000.00. I understand most of it was overhead. The funny thing about it is that all the stuff was underneath. Now we put it in front of the pilot at $4,000 an engine.

     J. A. Sheedy: It is definitely settled that these four divisions must be equipped in the next two years, the Baltimore and Atlantic City and Indianapolis and Panhandle and one on the Main Line?

     Mr. Rudd: No. We didn't quite settle that. The Interstate Commerce Commission told us we have got to get them in. The first three by January 1, 1925, the other one by February 1, 1926. That gives us a little less than a year to get in the first three and we don't know whether they will approve it after it is in or not, because they won't tell us. I do know that to put it in in addition to the signals, the overlap has been approved, except that they have to change it, will be about $175,000.00. But ours has not been approved yet and they won't approve it until we put in the signals. The Santa Fe is installing some and we will wait to see what happens. I have recommended a signal in the cab on the engine between Baltimore and Harrisburg and then develop train control, that is pneumatic equipment and the governor, which is the speed control, develop that on the Lewistown Branch and have the money appropriated and then, if it works, put it on the Baltimore Division afterward. In the meanwhile, see if they do approve it on the Santa Fe. If the turn the Santa Fe down, we will say, "Look at the millions we saved."

     W. B. Wood: You say you at one time were opposed to the cab signals. Are you taking the cab signals as the lesser of two evils?

     Mr. Rudd: Now, that question of yours is awfully ambiguous. You know, the funny thing about the English language, is you can say almost anything without meaning it. "The fellow knows more than most." Well, you can't, because most is more than more. How can you know more than most when most is the most? You ask me if I am sold to that cab signals. I don't know. There is a difference in being sold by it and being sold to it. If I am sold with it, it is because I have been very badly fooled. But, answering fairly, I am. I have watched that thing work for over a year. We do have a little trouble. We have had one or two turns on the Williamsport Division where it would go from "S" to "A" and back persistently. The cab has two dials, one is "A" and the brakes go on and the other is "R" and restricts and the the other is "S", which is slow. When a fellow runs into a block, he can run with an "A" indication and when he gets in territory that would be protected by an automatic block signal, he gets the "R" indication which means slow down to restricted speed and when he gets within 2,000 ft. of what would be the block, we gets the "S". The cab signal works. The airbrake failures have just begun to develop. We have been developing this thing for 50 years and they have just got their eyes open and all you fellows in the Motive Power Department know how dumb the Motive Power Department folks are, don't you? The only thing which you never new before is how smart the signal folks were. I do believe with that cab signal, we would do away with practically all the accidents we had.

     Q. You said you thought the enginemen didn't look out. I wondered what changed your mind to think that, at that present time, it was not going to attract the engineman's attention.

     Mr. Rudd: Because he put it up to the front window of the cab in such a position that he can't see it without looking out and, if he looks out, he sees it. Another thing, with the train control, if a man doesn't see it and doesn't stop within five seconds, he is going to get stopped. If it changes from "A" to "S", he has got to acknowledge that by an operating lever. If we does acknowledge it and reduces his speed below the restricted speed, he can proceed. If he does not reduce his speed, the air-brakes stay cold after about eight seconds slowing down below 30 miles and he can run along under 30, but if he exceeds 30, he gets blocked. If he does not acknowledge that, he gets stopped. If he is running under "R", he has got to acknowledge that or get stopped. If he does not acknowledge that and does not reduce below 15, he can release and run under. He has got to recognize it and has got to acknowledge it and then release. If anything happens between the time that he acknowledges and releases his train, it is stopped. But he can release and run under 15 miles an hour after he has acknowledged and after he has released. Suppose he does acknowledge and he does release and he is running 15 miles an hour and he falls dead and his fireman falls dead and the brakeman falls dead and they call fall dead and kill some man at the hind end, even the train control won't stop. The simplest form of train control is the automatic stop and that is what we mean. You run along and you have got to stop, if it works, and after you have stopped you can release it as fast as you want. With our present control, you have to slow down below 15 miles an hour. The cab signal won't put your brakes on, but my feeling is that the enginemen that we have and the responsibility that we have--we have got a few weak sisters, got them everywhere, we can't get away from them--but, with very few exceptions, if we can give our engines the automatic, if we could give them cab signals, we would have fewer accidents. We wouldn't get as many false clears as we do with the signals. We will never get anything that will prevent accidents and will never get a class of enginemen but what some are crooked sticks. When you figure that 8% of the apostles were crooked, you can't expect everybody else to be straight.

     Q. I have no more questions, but I would like to hear that band.

     Selection by New York Division Police Band.

     Solo by Mr. Meade of Meadows Shops--"Barefoot Trail", and "Mother Machree".

     Selection by New York Division Police Band.

     F. L. D.: Our time is about up and I want to thank the police band very much and Mr. Meade.

     Meeting adjourned.