Camden, N. J.
Looking from Walnut Street Wharf, Philadelphia, 1842.
DECADENCE OF THE STATE WORKS.

Within a few years after the through line of the State Works was put in operation it became evident that the dreams of its projectors would not be realized, owing to the complex character of the chain of communication, which consisted of four links: (1) a railway 82 miles long, from Philadelphia to Columbia; (2) a canal 172 miles long, from Columbia to Hollidaysburg; (3) a Portage railroad 36 miles long, with ten inclined planes, operated by cumbersome machinery; and (4) a canal 105 miles long, from Johnstown to Pittsburgh.

The great impediment to the successful operation of such a system resulted from the fact that at least for one quarter, and often for one third of the year, the climate was so severe that the two canals were closed by ice; the traffic was also greatly reduced toward the end of the season by uncertainty regarding the date when the frost would compel the line to suspend through business.

When the spring opened and business on the railroads became heavy, the imperfect tracks were generally found to need extensive repairs because of damage by the frost, while the spring floods and freshets frequently injured the locks and made breaches in the banks of the canal; but the most serious trouble occurred on the Portage Railroad, where, owing to unfavorable geographical and geological conditions, the engineers found it necessary, in a distance of thirty-six miles, to overcome more than double the entire rise and fall along the whole line of the Erie Canal. Although the system of transshipment, by loading and unloading each article of merchandise, which was at first necessary at both ends of the Portage Railroad, was afterwards obviated by the construction of sectional boats and cars with movable bodies that could be lifted off the wheels, the traffic was conducted with delays and expense, since "the wear and tear of the sectional boats and movable car bodies and the amount of dead-weight that must be carried were found to be serious objections to both these plans." In addition to these difficulties the locks and waterway of the Pennsylvania Canal allowed the passage of much smaller boats than did the Erie, and this also entailed extra expense for conducting the traffic, especially of heavy material in bulk in small boats.

It is true that the main line of the Pennsylvania State works possessed an advantage over the Erie Canal in the first link of eighty-two miles of railroad from Philadelphia to Columbia, and in the more favorable climatic conditions allowing of eight or ten additional weeks traffic each year; but even these apparent advantages, together with the saving in transshipment rendered possible by the amphibious vehicle described above, were more than overbalanced by the expense of operation and delays incident to the use of a "boat on wheels" on the railroad from Philadelphia to Columbia and the transportation of that clumsy vehicle over the ten inclined planes of the Portage Railroad. Under these circumstances the necessity for one continuous all-rail line from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh soon became apparent to the merchants of Philadelphia and to those living at other points in Pennsylvania.
RAPID GROWTH OF THE WESTERN STATES.

Because of vexatious delays and the high tolls in force in 1839, the merchants and millers of Western Pennsylvania had found it cheaper to ship flour down the Ohio and Mississippi to New Orleans, and thence to Philadelphia by vessel, than to patronize the Pennsylvania line. Cumberland coal was being delivered at Baltimore by rail at such low rates in 1841 that the officers of the Portage road recommended the policy of lines through new territory. The locomotive had also been developed in power and in speed until it had become a practical machine for constant service.

According to the census of 1840 the population of Pennsylvania had increased to 1,725,000, Ohio to 1,520,000, Indiana to 686,000, Illinois to 476,000, and Kentucky to 780,000, and the population of the United States at large had increased nearly one-third, from thirteen

encouraging the business of mining bituminous coal in the Alleghenies by allowing free passage for coal boats, charging three mills a ton per mile on the coal only, with no road toll on the cars.

During the administrations of Jackson and VanBuren the railroad systems of the United States had been rapidly extended, notwithstanding the panic of 1837, and in a decade a class of men better skilled than their predecessors in railway construction had been developed by the experience gained in building long millions in 1830 to seventeen millions in 1840.

Philadelphia had grown to be a city of homes containing 228,000 people. Baltimore's population had reached 133,000. The railroad had brought prosperity to Lancaster and to Harrisburg. Pittsburgh contained a population of 22,000; Cincinnati claimed 46,000; Louisville, 21,000; and St. Louis, 16,500; while Columbus and Springfield had become important towns, and even Chicago had a population of 4,400. But the greatest growth during the decade from 1830 to 1840 was in

A sectional canal-boat on trucks descending into a slip.
Baltimore and Vicinity. 1840.
New York State, where the population had increased to nearly 2,500,000, while in New York City (including Brooklyn), by the increase in steamboat lines and railways, in addition to the great Erie canal system, the number of inhabitants had reached 350,000, almost equaling the combined populations of the rival cities of Philadelphia and Baltimore.

Iron manufacturing had grown in importance. Seven hundred iron furnaces and six hundred bloomeries, forges and rolling mills were in operation in the State of Pennsylvania, consuming over three-quarters of a million tons of fuel in producing 190,000 tons of iron. Coal mining had become a great industry; over 1,125,000 tons having been mined and marketed.

Fertile Ohio was then the greatest wheat-producing State of the Union, and the four States of Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana and Illinois, in addition to marketing the immense crop of 125,000,000 bushels of Indian corn, almost equaling the wheat production of thirty millions of bushels raised by the five old States of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland.

A large proportion of this yield of grain was marketed on the Atlantic seaboard, and hundreds of sectional canal boats were used in the traffic. At that time it was not unusual to see one of these “section boats” standing on its wheel trucks in Market Street, Philadelphia, while the captain’s wife performed her washing and “put her clothes out to dry on the deck.” But the delays and expense in crossing the Portage and in the transshipment of the sectional boats at Johnstown, Hollidaysburg and Columbia, and the loss of cargo from breaking down en route, rendered this method of transportation much more unsatisfactory than the traffic on the New York Canal line from Buffalo to Albany, which was conducted without serious delay, the canal boats being conveyed in fleets from Albany by rapid steam tow-boats down the Hudson to the wharves in New York City.

When the administration of Governor Porter was inaugurated in 1839, less than five years after the formal opening of the through line, the public works were in a deplorable condition.

The Canal Commissioners had presented a demand on the State Treasurer for $2,805,000, of which $1,679,000 were to be expended for “extraordinary repairs.” The board represented that “these excessive expenditures were necessary to put the line in proper condition.”

The transporters had generally managed to have the roads conducted to suit their convenience and interests, and while the introduction of the section boats had done much “to compel the lines to charge moderate rates,” they at the same time “inflicted much injury upon the roads, and imposed a heavy tax upon the motive power.”

For several years the State’s motive power had been managed with such poor judgment that of the 27 locomotives on the Philadelphia and Columbia Railroad in 1839, only five were fit for service, and the “stone block track” was kept in such poor repair that the locomotive was regarded as “lucky” which could make the round trip of 164 miles between Philadelphia and Columbia without breaking down, while locomotives that required repairs were frequently kept for a long time out of service, because of the indifference of the foremen and mechanics in the repair shops, who held their positions largely through political influence.

As early as June 16, 1836, the Legislature had passed an act authorizing the Canal Commissioners to expend $2000 upon a survey “across the Allegheny mountains, with a view to avoid, if possible, the inclined planes on the Portage Railroad.” Urged by the continued appeals of the merchants and manufacturers, the Board of Canal Commissioners in the spring of 1839 ordered a survey “for a continuous railroad from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh,” and the work was put under the direction of Charles L. Schlatter, civil engineer.

The following extracts are taken from Mr. Schlatter’s report to the Board of Canal Commissioners, which was read in the House of Representatives, January 15, 1841:
To the Pres't and Board of Canal Commissioners:

Gentlemen:—Since my appointment of August 1, 1839, as engineer directing the surveys for a continuous railroad from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh, instrumental examinations and locations upon the several routes which were selected as presenting the most favorable features for a line of railroad, without inclined planes, have exceeded one thousand and sixty miles. . . .

The limited amount of the funds appropriated prevented me from extending the surveys as far as I had intended; but by confining myself to what appeared the most practicable routes, I have been enabled to complete continuous lines from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh, by three grand routes, designated as the Northern, Middle, and Southern routes . . .

**THE NORTHERN ROUTE**

commences at Harrisburg and follows the valley of the Susquehanna to Northumberland, thence by the West Branch to the mouth of the Bald Eagle creek, and by the valley of the Bald Eagle and one of its tributaries to the summit of the Alleghany mountain, where it passes through a depression known as Enigh's Gap; from thence descending to the western slope of the mountain, it crosses the Moshannon creek, passes to the Clearfield creek, and follows that stream to its junction with the Beaver Dam branch; thence ascending the Beaver Dam branch, crosses the headwaters of Chest creek, to the headwaters of the Black Lick, crosses the Conemaugh near Blairsville, and pursuing a very direct course through Westmoreland county, strikes the Monongahela river at the mouth of Turtle creek, whence it is carried by the eastern shore of the river to Pittsburgh.

**THE MIDDLE ROUTE**

will occupy the same ground as the Northern route, from Harrisburg to the mouth of the Juniata river, to its junction with the Little Juniata. By the Little Juniata and Sugar Run it attains the summit of the Allegheny mountain, where it passes west through a depression two miles north of the Portage Railroad, known as Sugar Run Gap. From this point two subroutes have been surveyed: one by the Conemaugh, running nearly parallel with, and using a portion of, the Portage Railroad; the other pursuing the course of the Black Lick; both routes crossing the Conemaugh, and joining the Northern route near Blairsville, follow the line already described to Pittsburgh.

**THE SOUTHERN ROUTE**

is that projected from Chambersburg to Pittsburgh, passing through the counties of Franklin, Bedford, Somerset, Westmoreland, and Allegheny.

This route was surveyed by order of the Board of Canal Commissioners by Hother Hage, Esq., principal engineer in the service of the State of Pennsylvania, during the summer and fall of 1838, and a line of railroad located upon which no grade exceeded sixty feet per mile. This line, upon examination, has been adopted with but few variations; and the estimates, gradients and curvatures, with little alteration from Chambersburg to Laurel Hill, have been embodied in the material forming that portion of my report which relates to this route.

The surveys on the Southern route include the location of a macadamized road from Loudon, in Franklin county, to Laugl~lnstown, in Westmoreland county, prosecuted in accordance with a provision in the sixth section of "An act to provide for continuing the improvements of the State, etc., viz. to complete the survey of a railroad from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh, . . . and the engineer surveying the same, in connection therewith, is hereby authorized to make a survey to ascertain the practicability of a macadamized road of an easy grade from some point at or near Chambersburg to a point west of Laugl~lnstown." The perfect practicability of this road has been ascertained, and the distance by the line surveyed, with no gradient exceeding two and a half degrees (or 230 feet per mile), only exceeds that by the old turnpike eleven miles.

The practicability of forming the road from Loudon to Chambersburg is so well known that I did not deem it necessary to carry the surveys farther than Loudon.

Owing to the great extent of the lines which have been surveyed, and upon which it will be necessary to make careful estimates of the cost, I shall not be able to lay before you the maps, profiles, estimates and comparisons upon the several routes before April, when you will be enabled beyond a doubt to ascertain the various merits and demerits of each line, and to decide from facts which cannot be disputed the route which should be recommended to the citizens of Pennsylvania.

Local advantages and local interests do not, in my opinion, properly pertain to the department of an engineer. Holding this opinion, and having been left untrammeled by intermediate points between the place of starting and the destination of the road, I have endeavored, as far as lay in my power, to discover the nearest, cheapest, and best route for a railroad between Harrisburg and Pittsburgh.

It remains with your Board to decide which route would prove most beneficial to the interests of the State, as it is by no means certain that the shortest road would prove most profitable, for the resources of the country which may be developed by the longer line might counterbalance and even exceed the advantages gained in distance by the shorter,
whilst many other benefits might arise in the course of the investigation between the rival lines which may place the longer route in a position to be the most conducive to the prosperity of the commonwealth.

The route for a continuous railroad which will connect Harrisburg with Pittsburgh by the shortest distance and with the least expense has been found to be that already noticed as the Middle route.

The results of the surveys on this route have proved so much more favorable than I had any reason to expect that I am induced to give to your Board a more detailed description than I had intended in this report. The importance of the discovery of a line of railroad from the canal at Huntingdon, in Huntingdon county, to Johnstown, in Cambria county, by which all the inclined planes on the Portage railroad can be avoided, with an increase of distance of only four miles over the route by the canal and the Portage railroad (without any inclination exceeding 45 feet per mile), also induces me to enter more minutely into the details of the surveys than this report would otherwise warrant. . . . The route above mentioned, and others connected with the Portage railroad, will be noticed in the following description of the Middle route.

The report further states that—

The whole distance from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh by the Middle route has been found to be 242.86 miles on the line surveyed, but it is confidently believed that at least one mile in distance can be saved by a location over nearly the same ground.

It was not until ten years later that tracks were laid on a portion of the route recommended in Mr. Schlatter's report, and then under the direction of engineers not in the service of the State.

Governor Porter having been re-elected by an increased majority in 1841, began his second term in January, 1842. Although in his next annual message the total estimated cost of the State Works was placed at the enormous sum of $30,533,629.15, the Governor stated hopefully that "a tax of a few cents per ton upon coal and iron will extinguish this debt within the lifetime of those who are now upon the stage of public action."

He also informed the Legislature that the Canal Commissioners were engaged in correcting errors and abuses," and "that much had been done, but much remains to be done," for "the protection of the transportation lines had become an object of more importance than the encouragement of trade."

"Errors" in management and the "abuses" practiced by minor officers, coupled with the immense public debt which had accumulated in the construction and "repairs" of the State Works, aroused such great dissatisfaction throughout the State that the Legislature, by an act approved July 27, 1842, authorized and required the Governor to invite proposals for the sale of the public works.

The bill was entitled "An act to provide for the ordinary expenses of the Government, payment of the interest upon the State debt, receiving of proposals for the sale of the public works." The bill, which was divided into twenty-one sections, concluded as follows:

Section 18. That the Governor be and is hereby authorized to receive proposals for the sale of the North Branch Canal from Northumberland to Lackawanna creek, and the Erie extension of the Pennsylvania Canal; also the Columbia and Portage railroads and Main Line of the Pennsylvania Canal, and all other branches of railroads and canals belonging to the commonwealth.

Section 19. After the passage of this act the Governor shall cause to be published for two months in Harrisburg and Philadelphia and Pittsburgh a notice that proposals will be received at the State Department until the last day of November next for the sale of the works aforesaid, or either of them, for which State stock at par value will be received in payment.

Section 20. The said proposal shall be sealed up and directed to the Secretary of State, particularly stating the amount and the work proposed to be taken.

Section 21. It shall be the duty of the Governor, upon the meeting of the next General Assembly, to lay the said proposals before it, and if upon examination and consideration the amount to be given for all or any of the aforesaid divisions of the public works shall be deemed sufficient by the Legislature, then and in that case such provisions may be made to carry into effect the contract or contracts as may be agreed on and the Legislature shall adopt. Upon disposing of any of the said works the Secretary of State shall transfer the same under the great seal of the commonwealth, upon such conditions and restrictions as the Legislature shall by law direct, and an account of the stock so received in payment of the same shall be entered
by the Auditor General upon the books of his office and the certificates thereof cancelled.

The bill was certified by James Ross Snowden, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and William Heister, Speaker of the Senate, and approved "the twenty-seventh day of July one thousand eight hundred and forty-two by David R. Porter, Governor."

The Board of Canal Commissioners, in their report to the General Assembly for the year 1842, complain that "the transporters have managed to secure all the profits, leaving the State to pay the expenses; while the State has invested an immense amount, the transporters have comparatively little capital invested, yet the commonwealth has been receiving less than half the charges upon passengers," as appears by the following division of receipts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fare</th>
<th>Transporters received</th>
<th>State received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johnstown to Hollidaysburg</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
<td>$1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia to Columbia</td>
<td>$2.25</td>
<td>$1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5.25</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2.83</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dissatisfaction with this condition of affairs is shown by the report of the Commissioners for 1842, in which they state that "The liberal and repeated reductions of toll on the part of the Canal Commissioners have failed to secure a reduction of charges by the canal transporters."

No one seemed eager to buy the canals and railroads, for Governor Porter's message of July 4, 1843, states that only two proposals had been received for the purchase of the public works—one from John Bingham, Simon Cameron and James Bingham, who proposed to pay three million dollars for the Philadelphia and Columbia Railroad, its machinery and fixtures, in annual installments of $100,000, with interest at 5 per cent. per annum; another from George Lenman and Daniel Kendig, who proposed to pay $10,000 for the outlet lock at Portsmouth.

The average cost, from 1834 to 1844, to the Pennsylvania State lines for the transportation of coal between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh amounted to twenty-two cents a hundred pounds, or $4.40 per ton, and in addition, the tolls required by the State for the use of tracks and canals varied from $1.30 to $1.80 per ton. At the latter rate of toll the freight on a ton of coal, exclusive of handling and all incidentals, amounted to $6.20, and this sum was exclusive of the original price of the coal.

An examination of the records of the annual earnings and expenses of the Main Line shows that while "the reported expenditures have always been sufficient to leave a fair balance of net receipts upon which to base congratulations upon the exceedingly favorable results of our system of improvement," "the whole truth was not exhibited." "While the expenses are reported much below the real amount," the receipts were given by the Canal Commissioners at nearly $190,000 "more than by the Auditor General."

The commissioners had not been able to resist the temptation to exhibit a large balance of net receipts as possible." In order to do this the expenditures were divided into two classes, "ordinary" and "extraordinary." To the former were charged only "such items as were clearly chargeable to the current expenses of the year," but the damages by flood, renewals of locks and dams, the purchase of new locomotives and heavier rails, and numerous other items of necessary expenditure, were placed in the extraordinary list and carried to construction.

By this method in less than twenty years the reported cost of the Main Line was increased nearly four and a half millions of dollars, about two millions of which had been absorbed by the Philadelphia and Columbia, and a little over one million by the Portage road. In fact, the financial condition was such as to warrant the assertion by a well informed writer in 1855, that "The Main Line has never yet paid the first dollar of interest on the capital.

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1 The Main Line of the Pennsylvania State Improvements, its cost, revenue and expenditures, and present and prospective value. Published by T. K. and P. G. Collins, Philadelphia, 1855, p. 59. The author's name is not given.
expended in its construction, and the whole of the interest has been paid by taxation."

The same writer declared that "The Pennsylvania Canal line, in consequence of the construction of numerous rival lines through New York, Maryland and Virginia, and the great improvements in the art of transportation, has become the most expensive channel of communication between the Eastern and Western States, and cannot carry heavy freight at sufficiently low rates either to protect and retain the Western through trade, or encourage the development of our local resources and the improvement of our territory."

The reasons for this opinion were based upon the physical characteristics of the Pennsylvania State Canals and Railroads line, which were thus described by the same author:

The highest point of the Columbia Railroad is the Gap summit, which is 500 feet above tide. The total rise and fall of the Columbia Railroad is 2381 feet. The canal basin at Columbia is 237,5 feet above tide. The basin at Duncan's Island is 332 feet above tide. The lockage of the eastern division of the canal is, therefore, 93.5 feet. The lockage of the Juniata division is 575 feet. On the western division there are 472 feet of lockage. The summit of the Allegheny mountain is 1399 feet above the basin of the canal at Hollidaysburg and 1172 feet above the basin at Johnstown. The total rise and fall of the Main Line between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh is, therefore, 6112.5 feet. The rise and fall of the Portage Railroad is 2571 feet, or very little greater than that of the Columbia Railroad, a consequence of the defective location of the line between Philadelphia and Columbia. The rise and fall per mile on the Main Line is fifteen feet six inches. The rise and fall on its most formidable rival for the transportation of heavy Western freights, the Erie Canal, is only fifteen inches to the mile, or less than one-twelfth; in addition to this there are no transshipments on the Erie Canal, and its capacity when enlarged will be sufficient to pass boats of 280 tons, while the Pennsylvania Canal requires three transshipments, and boats of fifty tons are frequently aground.

Even if the Erie Canal be left out of view in the consideration of this question, the Pennsylvania Canal could not maintain a successful competition against the railroads of Maryland and New York. The impression is even yet extensively prevalent amongst those who have not kept pace with the improvements in locomotives, that railroads are suitable for light articles requiring rapid transportation, but canals must be relied upon for heavy and cheap freights. The origin of this opinion dates back to the days of horse power upon railroads. When the introduction of locomotives was first recommended by the Board of Canal Commissioners it was stated in their official report that an engine of the first class could carry 30 tons at a speed of six miles per hour. Since those days the effective power of the locomotive has been increased near an hundred-fold, and an engine of the first class can now draw 600 tons on a level, at a speed of twenty miles per hour, and could be made, if desired, to accomplish still more.

In the face of such a condition of affairs it was indeed true, as stated at that time, that "the Main Line has no cheering future; a darker history awaits it than the past has furnished."

In 1842, seventeen years after the completion of the Erie Canal, the Baltimore and Ohio Company succeeded in finishing their line to Cumberland. In this same year all-rail communication between Buffalo and Albany was established through the connection of several short lines separately chartered. The citizens of Philadelphia and eastern Pennsylvania seem then for the first time to have fully awakened to the dangers of losing the Western trade through the active competition which had been established on the north and south. The Commissioners in their report for 1842 call attention to the fact that "The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad is now finished to Cumberland; travel is more expeditious than by the Pennsylvania Railroad and canals; all proper means must be exerted to reduce the fare and the expenses of travel upon our improvements."
A year or two later the engineer of the Portage Railroad still further sounded the alarm in the following language: "Immense sums have been expended by New York upon our northern borders, and Maryland on our southern, for the purpose of opening avenues commensurate with the magnitude of the growing trade of the West seeking the Atlantic seaboard. The new roads are constructed with all the modern improvements, and every effort is made by each to surpass the other in the facilities afforded for cheap and rapid transportation."

"These are the facts. Let not Pennsylvanians, then, continue the suicidal policy of assisting these rivals in opposition to an improvement of her own creation, whose efforts are directed to the protection of her trade and the growth of her metropolis."

In a most interesting book,1 written by Eli Bowen, and published in 1853, the corrupt management of the State works by the politicians during the previous twenty years is thus forcibly described:

The appropriation of millions upon millions of dollars for the prosecution of the State Works called forth thousands of political adventurers, who, like a pack of ravenous wolves, pounced upon the tempting feast, their mercenary appetites leaving nothing but the skeleton of their hospitable victim. Like leeches, their blood-thirsty appetites became sharper with the increasing weakness of the prey, and they gnawed, like a poisonous mineral, at its interior vitality until the fretful clouds of bankruptcy hung over the feeble old Commonwealth, and ghastly Repudiation was about to lay its black seal upon her fallen credit! This was a gloomy, gloomy time! Nor have we yet recovered from its paralyzing effects. The reason of this unfortunate state of affairs was simply this: The original intention of the friends of an internal improvement system contemplated but one main thoroughfare throughout the State, with one or two radiating branches. Setting out vigorously with the prosecution of this laudable enterprise, the work was shortly overwhelmed with difficulties entirely foreign to its own merits. While yet unfinished, a large number of branches were proposed, to construct which millions of dollars were unblushingly asked for. The friends of these local branches took common ground—they would vote for no more appropriations for the main line, without their proposed branches were provided for. The main line, which was already recognized as a matter of downright necessity, and cheap at any cost, was thus saddled with a host of unproductive branches, the construction of which only impaired and complicated its own value to the State. The State, thus embarrassed, had to borrow an immense amount of money, while the objects upon which it was expended failed to yield revenue enough to pay even the annual interest. In the meantime, many portions of the work were incomplete, and in this way, year after year, millions were squandered without the return of a dollar in the shape of profit. The men employed on the improvements controlled the elections; few were elected to office except hungry political gamblers, and, of course, they had everything their own way.

The people, attributing most of the evil to the mismanagement of the works and the political influences operating upon the Executive in the appointment of their managers and superintendents, stripped him of these functions and vested their whole charge in a Board of Commissioners elected by their suffrages. This, however, effected little good, for the Canal Board, even now, is probably as corrupt as the most voracious political gourmand could desire. Elected entirely upon political considerations, the Commissioners act under its influences, and render the works subordinate to its purposes. Instead of our State works being, as they ought to be, a system of trade and commerce, regulated solely with that view, they are a vast system of political corruption, poisoning the atmosphere wherever they penetrate. The only effectual way for the people to rid themselves of the whole tribe of partisan speculators is to sell the works to the highest bidder, or bestow them on whatever parties will accept.

After citing the cost of the main line and each branch of the State works, and commenting upon the extravagant waste of funds expended in their construction, the author continues:

To the foregoing might be added some other lines proposed or commenced, as the Gettysburg Railway, running from that point to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in Frederick County, Maryland. This road, after $700,000 had been expended upon it, was finally abandoned as perfectly useless. Lying in an extensive copper region, it may some day be

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found worth while to complete it, inasmuch as the Hanover Branch Railroad, connecting with the Pennsylvania Railroad at Columbia, extends within a few miles of Gettysburg.

Such was the improvement system of Pennsylvania for which a debt of over $40,000,000 has been incurred, and which has probably consumed in losses by freshets and otherwise, in interest of capital invested, and in various other ways, of more than one hundred millions of dollars. Indeed, the prime cost of all improvements constructed by the State, including subscriptions to turnpikes and bridges, would hardly fall short of this astounding sum.

Appalled by the State debt that had accumulated, disgusted with the evidences of mismanagement on every hand, the most zealous adherents of the policy of State ownership of railroads were compelled to admit that the first experiment in America of managing a railroad by politicians had within the short space of one decade resulted most disastrously. What then was to be done? The failure to obtain a fair proposition when the works were offered for sale in 1843 showed, that although in the six years that had elapsed since the panic of 1837 the financial condition of the country had improved, yet no capitalists were willing to invest in a complicated transportation line badly located and out of repair.

But those in power did not abandon hope.